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Public policy makers have principally focussed on improving the operational efficiency of 
local government on the presumption that this will result in a more financially sustainable 
sector. We argue that it is erroneous to assume that an efficient local government entity will 
necessarily be more fiscally sustainable. To test this argument, we apply an innovative 
method for empirically testing the association between financial sustainability and 
operational efficiency to the New South Wales (NSW) local government system. Our results 
suggest limited positive associations between financial sustainability measures and municipal 
efficiency. 
 







The proposition that changes in organisational structure can have decisive and predictable 
effects on organisational performance can be traced back to the pioneering efforts of Bain 
(1951) in his analysis of the industrial production in market economies. These insights led to 
the emergence of industrial organisation (IO) as a separate field of inquiry with its 
characteristic structure-conduct-performance (SCP) analytical framework. In essence, the 
SCP model predicts that the structure of an industry influences its conduct which in turn 
affects its performance. Over time, the application of the SCP paradigm has been extended 
far beyond the realm of private profit-seeking firms in manufacturing and other industries to 
not-for-profit organisations, such as nursing homes (Nyman, 1991) and hospitals (Lynk, 
1995), as well as the public sector, including local government (Brueckner, 1982). 
 
In contemporary local government systems across the world, public policy makers have 
invoked the SCP framework to support the use of structural change through municipal 
consolidation as a means of improving the operational efficiency and/or financial 
sustainability of local authorities by increasing the size of local councils (see, for example, 
Faulk and Hicks, 2011; Dollery, Grant and Kortt, 2012; Santiago-Penas and Martinez-
Vazquesz, 2013). Advocates of structural change typically argue that mergers represent an 
effective method of enhancing the operational efficiency of local councils, reaping scale and 
scope economies, improving administrative and technical capacity, generating cost-savings, 
and strengthening strategic decision-making. By contrast, opponents of consolidation 
typically stress the lack of supportive empirical evidence in favour of mergers, the equivocal 
outcomes observed in case studies, and the divisive nature of amalgamations and the 
attenuation of local democracy. In the Australian context, so influential have been exponents 
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of ‘bigger is better’ in local government the country now has the fourth largest councils (in 
terms of population size) among OECD countries (Callanan, Murphy and Quinlivan, 2012). 
 
A common misapprehension on the part of local government policy makers engaged in 
structural reform through council consolidation resides in the conflation of municipal 
efficiency with local government financial sustainability. For instance, the Independent Local 
Government Review Panel (ILGRP, 2012, p. 22) states that ‘the challenge of mounting a 
concerted effort to improve the efficiency, productivity and competitiveness of NSW local 
government must be met if councils are to be sustainable’. Moreover, a key recommendation 
of the ‘Allen Report’ (Local Government and Shires Association, 2006, p. 26) into council 
financial sustainability was to ‘improve strategic planning and operational efficiency’. Similar 
emphasis on efficiency pervades reports into municipal sustainability of Greater Perth 
councils (Metropolitan Local Government Review Panel, 2012) and Queensland local 
government (Local Government Reform Commission, 2007). Yet, none of the reports cited 
present any empirical evidence to suggest that municipal efficiency is indeed associated with 
sustainability.  Despite the absence of supportive empirical evidence, it is widely presumed 
that larger local authorities (as measured by population size) will not only be more efficient 
through increased scale and scope economies and other factors, but also more financially 
viable (as proxied by financial sustainability indicators). 
 
This presumption can have deleterious effects. For example, policy makers can erroneously 
believe that policy measures aimed at improving the operational efficiency of municipalities 
in a given local government system, such as municipal mergers, will necessarily and 
invariably improve the fiscal viability of these local authorities. However, in the real world, 














municipal financial sustainability, as we shall demonstrate in this paper in the context of New 
South Wales (NSW) local government. Accordingly, policy makers may be wise to employ 
policy measures which separately address municipal efficiency and municipal financial 
sustainability. 
 
In contrast to Canada, the United Kingdom and United States, but in common with New 
Zealand, Australian local government has a relatively narrow range of functions consisting 
mainly of ‘services to property’, such as local planning and development, waste collection 
and disposal, and the provision of local infrastructure, although over the past three decades 
the emphasis in service provision has shifted towards a more expansive ‘services to people’ 
orientation (Marshall, 2008). Australian local government is funded through a combination of 
property taxes, fees and charges, intergovernmental grants and developer charges. NSW local 
government is comprised of 152 ‘general purpose councils’, 12 ‘special purpose councils’ 
and the NSW Aboriginal Land Council. In NSW the regulatory framework governing the 
activities and performance of local councils consists of the NSW Division of Local 
Government, the NSW Local Government Grants Commission and ancillary regulatory 
bodies, as well as a Local Government Act and supporting legislation. NSW local 
government is a ‘creature of statute’ insofar as the NSW Government enjoys almost 
unlimited regulatory powers. 
 
NSW local government has been in the throes of a debate over local government reform 
centred on municipal amalgamation since August 2011. At that time NSW Minister for Local 
Government Don Page established an Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP, 
2013a, p.9) ‘to formulate options for governance models, structures and boundary changes’ to 




(2013a) released an interim report Future Directions for NSW Local Government: Twenty 
Essential Steps which argued that ongoing council fiscal sustainability ‘must involve some 
amalgamations of existing councils’, especially in the Greater Sydney Region. In its final 
report Revitalising Local Government (2013b) the Panel reiterated its call for widespread 
council consolidation concentrated in the Greater Sydney Region, based on the presumption 
that bigger councils would be more efficient and thereby more financially sustainable. 
 
As part of its deliberations, the Panel drew extensively on financial sustainability measures 
which the NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp, 2013) had been commissioned to produce. In 
its report Financial Sustainability of the New South Wales Local Government Sector, TCorp 
(2013) calculated ten financial sustainability ratios (FSR) for each council
1
. Although TCorp 
(2013) has been criticised in the literature (Drew and Dollery, 2014a), the FSR developed by 
TCorp (2013) do cover the central themes of liquidity, debt serviceability and operating 
performance which are common to almost all suites of sustainability measures (Levine et al., 
2013). Moreover, the FSR also provide measures of infrastructure backlog and maintenance, 
which are often absent in other jurisdictions. This presents empirical scholars of local 
government with a rich source of data to examine whether there is an association between 
municipal efficiency and financial sustainability, at least within the NSW local government 
system, an empirical exercise which has not hitherto been attempted in the literature.  
 
The paper itself is divided into four main parts. Section 2 sketches the evolution of thought 
on municipal efficiency and financial sustainability in local government. Section 3 outlines 
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 It is acknowledged that other states employ different measures of financial sustainability. For instance, the 
Queensland Treasury Corporation (QTC, 2008) employs a subset of the TCorp (2013) financial ratios to 
measure financial sustainability in the Queensland municipal sector. Because this study is set in the context of 
NSW it follows that TCorp (2013) financial sustainability ratios are employed. Clearly there is scope to replicate 
this study in other jurisdictions within Australia and abroad to address the presumption that efficiency is 
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the data and empirical strategy employed in the paper. Section 4 discusses the results of the 
statistical estimations. The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks in section 5. 
 
2. Operational Efficiency and Financial Sustainability in Local Government 
As we have seen, public policy makers often conflate economic efficiency and financial 
sustainability in local government, especially in the context of structural reform aimed at 
increasing the operational efficiency of local authorities by increasing their size in population 
terms through council consolidation. However, while the purported relationship between 
operational efficiency and financial sustainability has undoubted intuitive appeal, the two 
terms are by no means inevitably linked. 
 
Operational efficiency in local government is customarily defined as maximising output from 
a given set of inputs which is equivalent to what economists refer to as technical efficiency 
(TE). In the local government context this typically means maximising outputs, such as roads 
and other infrastructure, recreation, and welfare services, for any given set of inputs, like the 
quantity of staff (generally measured in full time equivalent units), machinery and materials. 
 
By contrast, financial sustainability is centred on the enduring continuation of the local 
council as a functioning entity. Typical definitions of financial sustainability in local 
government focus on the long-run fiscal viability of municipal entities. For example, Access 
Economics (2006, p.55) defined financial sustainability as follows: ‘a council’s finances are 
sustainable in the long term only if its financial capacity is sufficient – for the foreseeable 
future – to allow a council to meet its expected financial requirements over time without 





definition of financial sustainability involves comparing long-run fund-raising ability with 
long-term expenditure needs. 
 
Historically, the empirical literature on local government performance has concentrated on 
using multiple regression analysis to investigate the incidence of scale, scope and density 
economies, both in terms of specific municipal services and at the aggregate level, which 
represent only a single dimension of operational efficiency. Moreover, the resultant empirical 
evidence has been mixed and inconclusive, especially at the ‘whole-of-local-government’ 
level (see, for example, Andrews, 2013; Bel, 2013; Dollery, Grant and Kortt, 2012).  
 
However, a number of limitations exist when using multiple regression for the analysis of 
efficiency. For instance, multiple regression can only examine one output at a time and 
requires a priori specification of functional form (Coelli et al., 2005). These limitations have 
been largely addressed through the use of non-parametric approaches such as data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) which can measure the relative technical efficiency with which 
multiple inputs are converted into multiple outputs. By and large municipal DEA studies have 
concentrated on identifying the determinants of local government efficiency, with particular 
emphasis on the association between municipal size and efficiency (see, for instance, Da 
Cruz and Marques, 2014; Kalb, 2014). At the same time, policy makers and scholars alike 
have begun to employ financial ratio analysis to measure municipal sustainability (see, for 
example, ILGRP (2013); Drew and Dollery (2014a); Kloha, Weissert and Kleine, 2005).  
 
This study breaks new ground by examining whether the disparate strands of empirical 
enquiry (DEA focussed on municipal efficiency and financial ratio analysis focussed on 
municipal sustainability) have any statistically significant association. This is an important 
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question not only because it addresses the presumption pervading a host of local government 
sustainability inquiries that efficiency is a determinant of sustainability but also because it 
establishes a sound methodology for combining the extant empirical approaches for the 
pursuit of public policy questions
2
. As such it produces a bridge between the approaches 
dominated by scholars of accounting (financial ratio analysis) and the methods and concepts 
generally considered the domain of economists (DEA).  
 
It is more than a little surprising that the association between measures of financial 
sustainability and municipal efficiency has not previously been empirically tested in local 
government since it represents an important question for public policy makers and scholars 
alike. Thus, should an empirical link between municipal efficiency and financial 
sustainability not exist then this will call into question the presumption that financial 
sustainability can be improved simply by enhancing operational efficiency. In the absence of 
a statistical link of this kind, scholars would need to shift emphasis to identifying the 
determinants of sustainability and policy makers to formulate policy instruments beyond 
council consolidation. 
 
There are several reasons why municipal efficiency may not be associated with financial 
sustainability. In the first place, past performance may affect financial sustainability. For 
instance, a string of previous poor operational performance may now have become manifest 
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 We acknowledge the work of Doumpos and Cohen (2014) who conducted 2
nd
 stage regression of ‘efficiency’ 
scores against population regressors and four accounting ratios (which focussed largely on the sources of 
municipal revenue). However, there is good reason to believe that the ‘efficiency’ measure employed as the 
regressand was flawed given that it used the book value of assets as a proxy for municipal goods and services 
outputs. Critically, such an approach assumes depreciation accruals are consistent, that recognition and 
revaluation of assets was appropriate and that some sort of association exists between the level of goods and 
services provided and the capital stock held by the municipality. Moreover, no suggestion was made by 
Doumpos and Cohen (2014) that the four ratios employed in the second stage regression represented 
municipal sustainability in any way, nor was there any attempt to find an association between efficiency and 
sustainability.  
Deleted: ¶
Deleted: Historically, the empirical 
literature on local government performance 
has concentrated on investigating the 
incidence of scale, scope and density 
economies, both in terms of specific 
municipal services and at the aggregate 
level, which represent only a single 
dimension of operational efficiency. 
However, the resultant empirical evidence 
has been mixed and inconclusive, especially 
at the ‘whole-of-local-government’ level 
(see, for example, Andrews, 2013; Bel, 
2013; Dollery, Grant and Kortt, 2012). 
Municipal management performance has 
also attracted the attention of scholars of 
local government efficiency. Management 
performance relates directly to operational 
efficiency because management discretion 
determines how inputs are combined for a 
given set of outputs. Empirical evidence has 
emerged which suggests that management 
may have an effect on local government 
performance (see, for instance, Boyne and 
Enticott, 2004; Andrews et al., 2005).¶
¶
More recently, public policy makers and 
scholars alike have shifted their emphasis 
away from efficiency measurement to 
financial sustainability evaluation in local 
government. As we have seen, recent 
salient example of this tendency in 
contemporary Australian local government 
can be found in the reform process debate 
engendered by the NSW Government when 
it initiated an assessment of NSW local 
government by an Independent Local 
Government Review Panel. The Panel 
(2013b) proposed far-reaching municipal 
mergers, centred largely in the Sydney 
metropolitan area aimed at improving the 
operation of local government and its 
financial sustainability.¶
¶
Although TCorp (2013) has been criticised 
in the literature (Drew and Dollery, 2013), 
the Financial Sustainability of the New 
South Wales Local Government Sector 
report covered the central themes of 
liquidity, debt serviceability and operating 
performance which are common to almost 
all suites of sustainability measures (Levine 
et al., 2013). Moreover, similar financial 
sustainability ratios have been used 
previously in other NSW empirical studies 
(see, for instance, Jones and Walker, 2007). 
Financial Sustainability of the New South 
Wales Local Government Sector also 
provided measures of infrastructure backlog 
and maintenance, which are often absent in 
other jurisdictions. This presents a rare 
opportunity to assess whether there is an 
association between operational efficiency 
and financial sustainability in NSW local 
government, an empirical exercise that has 








as high debt loads, low capital reserves or infrastructure backlog problems. If financial 
sustainability is sufficiently poor, then many years of efficiency improvement may be 
required in order to materially improve fiscal sustainability. 
 
Secondly, demographic factors may impact on financial sustainability, independent of 
municipal efficiency. For example, changes in the demographic profile of a municipality may 
affect financial sustainability – through its ability to generate revenue – but not the efficiency 
with which capital, material and staff inputs are combined in order to produce a largely 
exogenous determined set of outputs. Furthermore, population growth is known to affect 
municipal infrastructure and finances (Ladd, 1992) either through its revenue implications or 
the need for the provision of new infrastructure necessitated by population growth. 
 
The size of infrastructure stock may also explain why efficient municipalities may not receive 
commensurate financial sustainability assessments. For instance, it is easier to adequately 
maintain relatively low levels of capital infrastructure. In this case municipalities coming off 
a low infrastructure base may perform better in terms of asset maintenance and liquidity 
sustainability measures for any given level of efficiency. Rates of depreciation of non-current 
assets may also disproportionately affect sustainability in at least two ways: (i) there is 
considerable discretionary latitude in depreciation methods and this raises the possibility that 
operating results may in some instances be more a reflection of depreciation parameters 
rather than actual performance (e.g., Pilcher, 2006; Pilcher and Van Der Zahn, 2010; Drew 
and Dollery, 2015); and (ii) in the case where a local council has serially under-depreciated 
assets, financial sustainability may be adversely affected when adjustments are subsequently 






Cost shifting by higher tiers of government can adversely affect fiscal viability independently 
of operational efficiency. For example, in the NSW local government milieu the NSW 
Government mandates concessions on property taxes to senior citizens by way of ‘pensioner 
rebates’. However, the NSW Government offers councils only partial funding of these 
pensioner discounts at 55 per cent (ILGRP 2013b). It follows that this negatively influences 
financial sustainability regardless of municipal efficiency. 
 
Finally, there are a number of exogenous factors which cannot be controlled for in regression 
models, but may nevertheless have a bearing on financial sustainability (but simultaneous not 
affect operational efficiency). These factors include climatic and ecological conditions, 
resource endowment and macroeconomic events with local and regional repercussions. For 
instance, climatic and ecological circumstances are relevant factors in road construction and 
maintenance (Chakrabarti, Kodikara and Pardo, 2002). Accordingly, whereas a given road 
may be constructed through an efficient combination of machines, materials and staff it may 
not be as long-lasting as a road constructed by a less efficient council which has more 
favourable climate and geology. Finally, macroeconomic events such as an increase in 
interest rates or a currency appreciation may affect financial sustainability, but not municipal 
efficiency. For example, an increase in interest rates will result in higher borrowing costs 
associated with inherited debt. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
Data 
The data used in this study was derived from the NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp) 
Financial Sustainability of the New South Wales Local Government Sector (TCorp, 2013), 
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the Comparative Information on NSW Local Government Councils 2010/11 report (DPC, 
2012), and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) National Regional Profile (2007-11). 
The TCorp report contains 2011 financial information for the 152 NSW councils while the 
Comparative Information on NSW Local Government Councils 2009/10 report contains an 
extensive range of data on the 152 councils, including details on population size, population 
density, population growth, and the percentage of the population identified as Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander. Additional data such as the annual average wage rate, and the 
percentage of unemployed people was derived from the ABS (2013). 
 
The above data sources were used to construct a single dataset that contained detailed 
information on the financial, demographic, economic, and social characteristics of NSW 
councils for 2011. In constructing our dataset it should be noted that only 109 councils had 
complete information on financial sustainability ratios (FSRs) (TCorp, 2013). However, by 
examining the financial statements for the missing councils we were able to produce – using 
the TCorp definitions – completed sets of FSRs for an additional 16 councils (thus bringing 
the total number councils with complete financial ratios to 125). Unfortunately, 27 
municipalities only had partial sets of FSRs, which explains why some of the statistical 
analysis is based on slightly less than 152 observations. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
To measure local government efficiency we employed data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
This non-parametric technique allows for the measurement of multiple inputs and outputs for 




min θ,λ θ, 
 
st  -yi + Yλ ≥ 0, 
 θxi – Xλ ≥ 0, 
 λ ≥ 0 
 
where yi is a vector of outputs (number of businesses, number of households, length of 
council maintained roads) and xi is a vector of inputs (number of staff (in fulltime equivalent 
units) and capital), θ is a scalar (the efficiency score for the municipality) and λ a vector of 
constants. The subscript i refers to the i
th
 council and the inequalities ensure non-negative 
weights. This CRS specification assumes that all councils are operating at optimal scale, 
whereby an efficiency score of 1 indicates a point on the efficiency frontier (i.e., a technically 
efficient council) and values less than 1 indicate the degree of relative efficiency (graphically 
these points lie in the interior of the efficient frontier). The variable returns to scale (VRS) 
algorithm is achieved by adding the convexity constraint so that I1′λ = 1, which ‘essentially 
ensures that an inefficient firm is only ‘benchmarked’ against firms of a similar size’ (Coelli 
et al., 2005 p.172). These scale adjusted VRS efficiency scores are used in our subsequent 
regression analysis. 
 
In order to conduct a DEA it is first necessary to decide on either an input or output 
orientation. An input orientation measures the proportion reduction possible with output held 
at least constant (Ji and Lee, 2010). By contrast, an output orientation holds inputs constant. 
In a municipal context the input orientation is preferred since ‘local governments take outputs 
as exogenous and have a large degree of control over the level of inputs, especially within 
functional areas’ (Worthington and Dollery, 2001 p.235). 
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Table 1 lists the definitions and measures of central tendency for the inputs and outputs used 
in our data envelopment analysis. Da Cruz and Marques (2014) have stated that ‘whilst the 
input variables might be similar for any country under analysis, the selection of outputs 
should be tailored to fit the specific competences of local government in each country’. 
However, this statement may underestimate the complexities and possibilities with respect to 
the specification of inputs. For example, our principal model uses the inputs of staff (in full 
time equivalent units) and material and contract expenses ($) broadly consistent with 
Worthington (2000), Fogarty and Mugera (2013) and daCruz and Marques (2014) but 
excludes borrowing costs ($) (which are an element of Worthington (2000) and Fogarty and 
Mugera (2013)). These input costs have been excluded on the basis that they are mostly 
associated with inherited debt (apart from the less significant short-term borrowings such as 
overdrafts) – and that such debts exhibit long-term temporal attributes more consistent with 
the notion of sustainability, than efficiency. 
 
With respect to outputs we concur with daCruz and Marques (2014). In the Australian local 
government context both Worthington (2000) and Fogarty and Mugera (2013) have used 
households, population and length of council maintained roads as proxies for output. 
However, Australian local government has a limited remit dominated largely by its focus on 
‘services to property’. Accordingly, Drew and Dollery (2014b) have argued persuasively that 
the use of population as a proxy overestimates municipal output and that the number of 
households should be used in preference (Drew and Dollery (2014b) also show that number 
of households are more accurate in inter-censal years in addition to being less volatile). It 
could therefore be surmised that previous studies which use both households and population 
would result in significant distortion to the efficiency frontier (in order to test our assertion 
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we compared our specification against one that included both population size and households 
as outputs and found that the alternative specification resulted in the inclusion of an 
additional six councils on the efficiency frontier, consistent with the premise that it produced 
an overestimate for council output). Moreover, businesses receive many of the same services 
as households (roads and rubbish in addition to economic services) suggesting that it should 
certainly be included as a proxy for local government output. Accordingly, our principal 
specification lists the number of businesses, households, and length of municipal roads as 
proxies for municipal output. 
 
Following our DEA, we then examined the statistical association between local government 
financial sustainability and efficiency. More specifically, we estimated a series of 
bootstrapped OLS regression models (with 500 replications) to examine the association 
between our 10 financial sustainability ratios (FSRs) and efficiency (i.e., the VRS efficiency 
scores) while controlling for a range of exogenous variables. Thus, our regression model is 
specified as follows: 
 
FSR = α + β1E + β2V + μ 
 
where FSR is our financial sustainability ratios, E is a vector of VRS efficiency scores, V is a 
vector of exogenous variables (population, population density, population growth, proportion 
of population over 65, proportion of population under 15, average annual wage, annual 
unemployment rate, percentage of ATSI population, percentage of NESB population, average 
residential rates, infrastructure value, annual depreciation, and total liabilities) and μ an 
independent identically distributed random error term. Table 2 provides definitions and 






In Table 3 we report our bootstrapped regression results for the association between our 
financial sustainability ratios (FSRs) and VRS efficiency scores. In estimating these 
regression models we found little evidence of multi-collinearity (as indicated by variance 
inflation factors scores well below 10) and logged our VRS efficiency score in order to 
counter skewness in the data. As a relative efficiency score of zero is not possible the 
undefined natural log of zero did not result in any lost observations. As a robustness check, 
we re-ran our entire analysis using available data from 2010 (some control variables such as 
unemployment data were not available for 2010), and found that this made little difference to 
our results (it should be noted that the long-run nature of sustainability suggests cross-section 
rather than panel regression). 
 
Associations between FSRs and Efficiency 
Looking across Table 3, statistically significant association between VRS efficiency scores 
and the following FSRs were observed: (i) Own Source Revenue (β = -11.894; p < 0.01), (ii) 
Unrestricted Current Ratio (β = 0.428; p < 0.1), (iii) Interest Cover Ratio (β = -1.025; p < 
0.01), (iv) Debt Service Cover Ratio (β = -0.747; p < 0.05), and (v) Capital Expenditure Ratio 
(β = 0.592; p < 0.01). Of these only the Unrestricted Current Ratio and Capital Expenditure 
Ratio associations were positive. Thus a 1% increase in the VRS efficiency score will lead to 
a 0.43% increase in the Unrestricted Current Ratio. Along similar lines, a 1% increase in the 
VRS efficiency scores will lead to a 0.59% increase in the Capital Expenditure Ratio. This 
relatively diminutive response suggests that a sustained improvement in efficiency over a 




By contrast, negative statistical associations were observed for the Own Source Revenue 
Ratio, the Interest Cover Ratio, and the Debt Service Cover Ratio. While these negative 
associations may at first appear confounding, they do, in fact, have rational explanations. For 
instance, the Own Source Ratio may well be evidence that effort neutrality is not being 
observed with respect to the Commonwealth fiscal equalisation grant scheme. This would be 
inconsistent with evidence from Worthington and Dollery (2000) well over a decade ago, 
however, it is possible that circumstances have changed given that the authors noted the 
tendency for grant distribution to deviate ‘solely from the basis of horizontal fiscal 
equalisation may be a further influence on inefficient outcomes’ (Worthington and Dollery, 
2000, p.95). Secondly, the observed association may indicate that the well-known flypaper 
effect (in which municipalities receiving grants tend to have increases in expenditure 
disproportionate to increase in other revenues) may be in operation (for evidence in support 
of the flypaper effect see, for instance, Dollery and Worthington, 1995; Oates, 1979; 
Grossman, 1990). This association, of course, requires further investigation however it is 
clear that there can be no suggestion that improving efficiency will enhance this particular 
local government sustainability ratio. 
 
The negative associations between efficiency and the Interest Cover Ratio and Debt Service 
Cover Ratio also present evidence which have a number of possible explanations. Firstly, it 
could be that in order for local government to be efficient it is necessary to carry higher levels 
of debt – this is supported by the fact that total liabilities (which in addition to long-term debt 
also include inter alia short-term debt, accrued employee entitlements, funds held as surety 
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and other-entity prepayments) also have negative statistically significant associations
3
. 
Moreover, it is also consistent with the observation that ‘more debt may be required in order 
for councils to grow financially and increase their asset base to generate revenue’ 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006, p.107). To take a specific example it may be necessary for a 
municipality to take on debt in order to purchase road plant which allows for the production 
of road surfaces at a much lower level of inputs. Secondly, because EBITDA (earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) is the numerator of both ratios it may be the case 
that efficient councils produce lower surpluses. Finally, the association with the Debt Service 
Cover Ratio alone may be explained by a hypothesis that efficient councils tend to make 
higher principal repayments thus paying down debt. While further investigation is required to 
definitively resolve this matter, it is equally clear that there is no reason to suggest that 
improving efficiency will result in an improvement to the two debt sustainability ratios. 
 
Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the existence of just two relatively diminutive 
positive associations from ten FSR supports our arguments in Section 2 that there may be 
little relationship between the distinct concepts of efficiency and sustainability. This, in turn, 
indicates that the regulatory and scholarly focus on municipal efficiency may well have been 
misplaced (except for the case of accountability, which is an altogether separate matter to 
sustainability). Thus it seems that if we are to arrest the much mooted decline in local 
government sustainability it will be necessary for regulators to search beyond the tried and 
trusted remedies of boundary change and management sanctions – which are targeted solely 
at improving elements of efficiency. 
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 This negative association between the two debt ratios and total liabilities makes intuitive sense when one 
considers that an increase in liabilities is likely to be associated with higher borrowing costs. Because 
borrowing costs are the denominator of both ratios in question it follows that an increase in liabilities will 
reduce the quantum of each ratio. 
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While the limited association between efficiency and sustainability may come as a surprise to 
regulators, it is entirely consistent with our conceptual analysis presented in Section 2. 
Explanations for other variables that may affect sustainability but not efficiency include: (i) 
temporal effects (including inherited debt), (ii) demographic effects (on revenue and 
expenditure), infrastructure stock (including depreciation of infrastructure) and (iii) 
exogenous effects (climate and geology, resource endowment and macroeconomic events). 
Several of these variables were able to be tested incidentally through our regression model 
specifications. 
 
Revenue raising ability which may be affected by the proportion of pensioner homeowners 
and the growth in municipal households was significantly associated with the Own Source 
Revenue Ratio and Operating Ratio which provides evidence in support of the contention that 
demographic influences on revenue raising ability may alter municipal sustainability. The 
total debt load of councils was also significantly associated with a number of ratios: Interest 
Cover, Debt Service Cover, Unrestricted Current, Asset Maintenance and Capital 
Expenditure. This provides some support for the argument that legacy debt (which is an 
element of total debt load) may affect sustainability despite the fact that it does not affect 
efficiency. Statistically significant associations were also in evidence between the quantum of 
depreciation and the Interest Cover, Cash Expense, Asset Renewal, and Capital Expenditure 
ratios. This is certainly an association worthy of further investigation – one which prima facie 
indicates that the discretionary latitude afforded by depreciation may have significant effects 
on measures of council sustainability. Finally, the stock of infrastructure was significantly 
associated with the Unrestricted Current Ratio, Infrastructure Backlog Ratio and Capital 
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Expenditure Ratio – once again illustrating the potential discord between efficiency and 
sustainability. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper sought to test whether it is reasonable to presume that improvements to municipal 
efficiency will automatically translate to enhanced financial sustainability. In the first 
instance we examined the concepts of municipal efficiency and financial sustainability and 
found that there were a number of mechanisms whereby financial sustainability might be 
affected without altering municipal efficiency. Many of these potential explanations for a 
discord between council efficiency and council fiscal sustainability were incidentally tested 
in our subsequent empirical analysis which largely supported our conceptual reasoning. 
 
However, the major focus of this paper lay in the empirical analysis of the association 
between municipal efficiency and municipal financial sustainability. This produced evidence 
of only two positive associations between the ten FSRs and DEA efficiency estimates which 
suggest that public policy makers may have erred in presuming that improvements in council 
operational efficiency would ineluctably lead to analogous improvements in financial 
sustainability. Moreover, the magnitude of these associations was such as to imply that 
sustained improvements to municipal efficiency over many years would be required to induce 
any material enhancement to the two FSR. 
 
The policy implications of these empirical results are stark. In essence, the existing 
preoccupation of public policy makers with structural reform through council consolidation 
aimed at enhancing operational efficiency are unlikely to improve local government 




need for a local public economics equivalent to that of the ‘Tinbergen Principle’ in 
macroeconomics, whereby the policy targets such as improved municipal efficiency and 
strengthened financial sustainability are aligned with separate policy instruments. Moreover, 
the limited associations between municipal efficiency and sustainability seem to support 
recent assertions in the scholarly literature that financial statement data alone and in its 
current form is not sufficient for the assessment of local government sustainability (Bolivar, 
Galera, Munoz, 2014; Drew and Dollery, 2014a). However, since the analysis in this paper 
was limited to NSW local government, future research should investigate the same question 
in other local government systems. More broadly, our results demonstrate the need for further 
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Table 1: Inputs and Outputs for Efficiency Model, 2011 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Inputs    
Staff No. of staff in Full Time Equivalent 
units 
293.04 282.23 
Capital Material and Other Expenses from 
Income Statement in $000 
22186.01 22215.78 
Outputs    
Businesses Number of Businesses in the 
municipality 
4559.78 6580.19 
Households Number of Households in the 
municipality 
16256.03 19423.12 
Roads Total length of roads (in kms) 









                                                             
4
 This output was only used to test our conjecture that use of both number of households and population size 
(employed previously in the extant literature) would result in a distortion of the efficiency frontier.  
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Table 2: Definitions and Measures of Central Tendency of Regression Variables, 2011 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent    
Operating Ratio (Operating revenue† - operating 
expenses) / operating revenue†. 
-6.874 9.82 
Own Source Revenue Ratio Rates, utilities and charges / total 
operating revenue‡. 
57.69 13.41 
Unrestricted Current Ratio (ln) Current assets less restrictions / 
current liabilities less specific 
purpose liabilities. 
1.13 0.53 
Interest Cover Ratio (ln) EBITDA / interest expense. 2.88 1.32 
Infrastructure Backlog Ratio (ln) Estimated cost to bring assets to a 
satisfactory condition / total 
infrastructure assets. 
-2.40 0.91 
Debt Service Cover Ratio (ln) EBITDA / (principal repayments + 
borrowing costs). 
1.90 1.14 
Capital Expenditure Ratio (ln) Annual capital expenditure / annual 
depreciation. 
0.03 0.61 
Cash Expense Ratio (ln) (Current cash and equivalents / (total 
expenses - depreciation - interest 
costs)) x 12. 
1.16 0.98 
Asset Renewal Ratio (ln) Asset renewals / depreciation of 
building and infrastructure assets. 
-0.61 0.65 
Asset Maintenance Ratio (ln) Actual asset maintenance / required 
asset maintenance. 
-0.23 0.46 
Independent    
Efficiency Scores (ln) Log of efficiency score -0.38 0.26 
Population (ln) Log of population 9.96 1.37 
Population Density (ln) Log of population density 2.95 3.31 
Population Growth Population growth 0.49 1.06 
Over 65 Percentage of population over 65 16.50 4.19 
Under 15 Percentage of population under 65 19.47 2.53 
Average Wage (ln) Log of average annual wage 10.92 0.23 
Unemployment (ln) Log of annual unemployment rate 1.67 0.35 
ATSI (ln) Log of percentage of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander population 
1.04 1.22 
NESB (ln) Log of percentage of Non-English-
Speaking Background population 
1.57 1.21 
Average Residential Rates Average residential rates 683.16 262.45 
Infrastructure Value (ln) Log of infrastructure value 12.68 0.88 
Depreciation Depreciation in dollars 13386.49 12802.45 
Total Liabilities (ln) Log of total liabilities 9.79 1.24 
†Revenue excludes capital grants and contributions. 




Table 3: The association between Financial Sustainability Ratios (FSR) and Efficiency, 2011 






























Efficiency (ln) 0.005 -11.894** 0.428+ -1.025** 0.574 -0.747* 0.592** 0.056 0.148 -0.245 
 (4.869) (3.488) (0.221) (0.382) (0.418) (0.350) (0.223) (0.322) (0.268) (0.182) 
           
Pop. (ln) 4.267 5.800* -0.133 0.614* 0.526+ 0.531* 0.049 -0.643** 0.461* 0.117 
 (2.701) (2.700) (0.154) (0.288) (0.312) (0.228) (0.165) (0.249) (0.202) (0.159) 
Pop. Den. (ln) 0.134 0.636 0.063 0.026 -0.237* -0.016 -0.054 0.044 -0.152* -0.004 
 (0.842) (0.790) (0.052) (0.080) (0.101) (0.076) (0.054) (0.074) (0.059) (0.037) 
Pop. Growth 2.136+ -0.862 0.027 0.244* -0.115 0.140+ 0.003 -0.059 0.034 -0.121+ 
 (1.138) (1.118) (0.056) (0.116) (0.112) (0.083) (0.067) (0.124) (0.065) (0.065) 
Over 65 -0.265 0.231 -0.009 0.048 -0.064* -0.005 0.005 -0.045 -0.037 0.009 
 (0.360) (0.226) (0.016) (0.032) (0.027) (0.025) (0.017) (0.032) (0.024) (0.013) 
Under 15 0.076 -0.528 0.014 0.016 -0.069+ -0.023 0.018 0.000 -0.024 0.021 
 (0.665) (0.397) (0.025) (0.059) (0.039) (0.050) (0.028) (0.055) (0.039) (0.021) 
           
Av. Wage (ln) -0.722 4.917 -0.540+ -0.814 -0.029 -1.100* 0.255 -0.980+ 0.305 0.161 
 (4.566) (3.836) (0.317) (0.558) (0.617) (0.534) (0.294) (0.592) (0.320) (0.265) 
UnN (ln) -5.295 -2.185 -0.180 -0.103 0.922** 0.014 -0.209 0.460 0.149 -0.100 
 (4.185) (2.885) (0.194) (0.338) (0.355) (0.284) (0.200) (0.298) (0.223) (0.142) 
ATSI (ln) -0.659 1.085 -0.084 -0.029 -0.250 -0.203 -0.029 -0.330* -0.101 0.025 
 (1.638) (1.359) (0.080) (0.197) (0.167) (0.157) (0.084) (0.129) (0.104) (0.085) 
NESB (ln) -2.430 2.681 -0.222* 0.290 -0.182 0.074 0.071 -0.225 -0.064 0.050 
 (1.805) (1.678) (0.086) (0.177) (0.165) (0.154) (0.128) (0.142) (0.132) (0.062) 
Av. Rates -0.009* 0.013** -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Infr. Value (ln) 0.959 -2.894 0.334** 0.276 -0.944** 0.333+ 0.224+ 0.198 -0.101 0.065 
 (2.839) (2.112) (0.116) (0.222) (0.235) (0.196) (0.131) (0.205) (0.171) (0.132) 
Deprec. -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000+ -0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000* -0.000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Liab. (ln) -1.768 0.062 -0.260** -1.750** 0.219 -1.393** 0.266** -0.196 0.010 -0.201** 
 (1.927) (1.477) (0.097) (0.188) (0.160) (0.185) (0.096) (0.147) (0.117) (0.075) 
Constant -13.386 -26.249 7.289+ 17.058* 4.369 18.348** -7.870* 17.467* -5.187 -2.525 
 (60.737) (50.951) (3.855) (7.006) (7.829) (6.746) (3.569) (7.074) (4.471) (3.687) 
           
N 149 148 149 133 139 134 148 147 149 148 
R2 0.180 0.703 0.360 0.596 0.224 0.506 0.203 0.291 0.173 0.146 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
